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In this paper we provide international evidence on the issue of whether the optimizing 
IS equation is more stable than a backward-looking alternative.  The international 
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major monetary policy shifts in 1979−80.  Our results suggest that the parameters in the 
optimizing IS equations are more empirically stable than those of the backward-looking 
alternative.  The use of dynamic general equilibrium modelling in empirical work does 
deliver material benefits, in the form of equations that are more suitable for monetary 
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1.  Introduction 
 
Dynamic stochastic general equilibrium (DSGE) models have become prevalent in 
monetary policy analysis; see Walsh (2003) and Woodford (2003) for book-length 
treatments.  A well-known property of these models is that, because they include first-
order conditions that arise from dynamic constrained optimization by private agents, 
forward-looking terms—i.e. the rational expectation of future values of endogenous 
variables—typically appear in the structural equations describing spending and pricing 
decisions.  This feature of DSGE models means that dynamics arising from 
expectations about policy behaviour are explicitly separated from dynamics that spring 
from the private sector’s preference and production functions.  Moreover, the 
preference and production functions are summarized by behavioural parameters that 
should not change with monetary policy regime.  This feature suggests that parameters 
in DSGE models should be constant in the face of the shifts in monetary policy regime 
that have been observed empirically in many countries.  By contrast, backward-looking 
representations of endogenous variables, such as vector error-correction or vector 
autoregressive characterizations of the data, do not distinguish dynamics from the 
different sources.  The coefficients in these backward-looking equations are, in other 
words, vulnerable to the Lucas (1976) critique. 
 
In a recent paper, Estrella and Fuhrer (EF) (2003) argue that for models intended for 
analyzing monetary policy, the advantages claimed for forward-looking optimization 
models over backward-looking models, do not hold in practice.  Specifically, EF apply 
a variety of statistical tests to evaluate the relative stability of the fully backward-
looking Rudebusch-Svensson (1999) model and one version of McCallum and Nelson’s 
(1999) forward-looking model, where the latter consists of the optimizing IS equation 
combined with the standard New Keynesian Phillips curve.
1 EF conclude that “of the 
current crop of small macroeconomic models, it seems that backward-looking 
formulations… are somewhat more stable than their forward-looking counterparts” 
(EF, 2003, p. 102).
2 
 
In this paper, we present some arguments and results that suggest that EF’s conclusion 
is unwarranted.  We focus on the stability of the IS equation; as discussed below, EF’s 
results shed little light on the stability of the New Keynesian Phillips curve.  Our 
reinterpretation of the evidence on IS function stability takes two parts.  First, we argue 
—————————————————————————————————— 
1 Earlier work (e.g. Favero, 1993; Ericsson and Irons, 1995) tested the Lucas critique on empirical 
consumption and money demand functions. 
2 This is the fifth of EF’s conclusions, and the one most relevant for the present paper.  We have little 
disagreement with EF’s four other conclusions.   2
that EF’s concentration on test statistics and forecast performance means they neglect 
the type of evaluation of the Lucas critique stressed in Lucas (1988).  Lucas’ approach 
to constancy compares directly the estimates of structural parameters across regimes; 
and by this criterion, as we show, EF’s work is consistent with stability of the 
McCallum-Nelson IS equation.  Secondly, EF reach their conclusions on US data; but 
as stressed in Lucas (1973) and Kormendi and Meguire (1984), international 
comparisons provide powerful evidence on the policy invariance of macroeconomic 
models.  Our international evidence takes the form of estimated IS equations for 
Australia and the United Kingdom.  We show that the estimated optimizing IS 
equations for these countries are considerably more stable and interpretable than the 
backward-looking alternatives. 
 
Our paper proceeds as follows.  Section 2 discusses and reinterprets EF’s evidence for 
the US.  Section 3 presents estimates of monetary policy reaction functions for the UK 
and Australia, and establishes that these countries exhibit the same kind of regime 
break in 1979−80 found by EF (2003, Section II) for the US.  Section 4 reports full-
sample and post-1979 estimates of the optimizing IS equation for the UK and Australia.  
The comparison shows that these estimates are similar to those for the US, and that the 
key structural parameter does not appear to change with policy regime.  Section 5 finds 
that, by contrast, there is evidence of parameter instability in the backward-looking 
Rudebusch-Svensson IS equation for both the UK and Australia.  Section 6 concludes. 
 
2.  Estrella and Fuhrer’s evidence for the US 
 
2.1 The forward-looking model 
 
The forward-looking, optimization-based model for which EF report unfavourable 
empirical results is the following familiar New Keynesian model.
3 
 
yt = Etyt+1 –σ(Rt – Etπt+1) + vt  (1) 
   
πt = Etπt+1 + λ(yt – yt*)  (2) 
 
Here yt is the log of output, yt* is the log of potential output (whose definition in this 
model we discuss further below), Rt is the nominal interest rate, πt the quarterly 
inflation rate, σ > 0, λ > 0, and vt is an IS shock.  The growing variables y and y* only 
—————————————————————————————————— 
3 Many studies have used versions of this model; EF focus on McCallum and Nelson (1999) because 
that paper used timing assumptions that imply a model of exactly the form of equations (1)−(2).  More 
complicated timing assumptions are used in (e.g.) Rotemberg and Woodford (1997).   3
appear in the system in stationary combinations with other variables—i.e. as the 
forward-looking difference term yt – Etyt+1 in the optimizing IS equation (1) and as the 
output gap term yt – yt* in the New Keynesian Phillips curve (2).  Therefore, the model 
could equivalently be written with detrended log output yt
d replacing yt and detrended 
log potential output yt
d* replacing yt*. The influence of optimizing behaviour is felt in 
the presence of forward-looking terms (Etyt+1 and Etπt+1) in each equation, as well as the 
use of rational expectations in the computation of the ex-ante real short-term interest 
rate, Rt – Etπt+1.  
 
To complete the model, EF specify a monetary policy rule (a reaction function for the 
short-term nominal interest rate) which they estimate on US data.  The estimated 
policy rule exhibits a break in response coefficients in late 1979.  EF seek to evaluate 
whether equations (1) and (2) are structural—in the sense that they are constant in the 
face of the 1979 policy regime change.  EF’s tests include evaluating the stability of 
the parameters of forward and backward-looking models via static simulations and 
test statistics for stability with known and unknown breakpoints. They estimate two 
versions of the forward-looking model, one with i.i.d. errors in the IS and Phillips 
curve equations, and an alternative with serially correlated shocks.  Graphical 
evidence indicates that the one-period static forecast generated by the backward-
looking model is superior to the forward-looking model for the post-1979 period.  The 
formal stability tests also support a preference for the backward-looking model. 
 
We contend that, on closer inspection, EF’s findings have little to say about the 
constancy of the New Keynesian system (1)−(2).  This reconsideration takes two parts.  
First, their analysis of the constancy of the New Keynesian Phillips curve is flawed by 
the failure to use a measure of the output gap (yt – yt*) that is consistent with the 
underlying theory.  Secondly, EF’s results on the IS equation add to existing evidence 
that this equation is indeed policy-invariant in US data.  We discuss each of these issues 
in the remainder of this section. 
 
2.2 Phillips curve evidence 
 
Quite apart from Lucas-critique issues, there is an important feature of optimization-
based models that distinguishes them from backward-looking models.  This feature is 
that they imply a disparity between the behaviour of detrended output, on the one hand, 
and the output gap, on the other.  This disparity applies in principle regardless of the 
detrending procedure applied in obtaining a detrended output series.  The source of the 
divergence is that the output-gap concept implied by optimization-based models is the   4
percentage discrepancy between two series—detrended output and detrended potential 
output—while detrended output records variation only in the first of these series.  
Detrended output will coincide with the output gap only in the case of a smooth (in the 
limit, nonstochastic) potential output series.  But stochastic DSGE models provide few 
a priori grounds for potential GDP (relative to its steady-state growth path) to be 
smooth.  On the contrary, potential output in these models corresponds to the value that 
output takes under flexible prices; and output under flexible prices is typically volatile 
and cyclical in flexible-price DSGE models (e.g. Prescott, 1986).  The time-variation in 
potential GDP reflects not only the presence of productivity shocks in the production 
function, but also variations in the optimal responses (under price flexibility) of labour 
and other endogenous productive inputs, to movements in real shocks (which include 
shocks to both production and utility functions).
4 
 
This distinction is relevant for the interpretation of EF’s results.  The real-activity 
variable that appears in their empirical IS equation is the same as that in their estimated 
Phillips curve.   The Congressional Budget Office (CBO) output-gap series is used in 
both equations—as the aggregate-demand variable in the IS function and the output-gap 
variable in the Phillips curve.  From a DSGE modelling perspective, however, output or 
detrended output is the appropriate variable to use in the IS equation, while the theory-
consistent output gap should be used in the Phillips curve.  The CBO gap series closely 
resembles quadratically detrended log output in US data; so, despite its label, the CBO 
series appears a better proxy for detrended output than the output gap.  By our criteria, 
therefore, EF used an appropriate real-activity measure in their IS equation, but not an 
appropriate measure of the gap in their Phillips curve.  It is therefore very difficult to 
interpret either EF’s test statistics for stability of the Phillips curve, or their joint tests of 
the stability and forecasting properties of the IS and Phillips curves.  In particular, it is 
impossible to make conclusions about the stability of the McCallum-Nelson structural 
model, because an omitted variable problem—the movements in potential GDP over 
the cycle—may be responsible for the unfavourable test results reported by EF.
5 
 
Existing results suggest that this omitted-variable problem is far from negligible.  
McCallum and Nelson (1999) found that detrended output can be a very poor proxy for 
—————————————————————————————————— 
4 This feature of optimization-based models was an important element of the discussion in McCallum 
and Nelson (1999), and has also been emphasized in McCallum (2001), Neiss and Nelson (2002, 2003) 
Woodford (2001, 2003), and others. 
5 The only (implicit) allowance for this omitted variable in EF’s specification is their specification of a 
serially correlated shock process in the Phillips curve.  Estimates of this shock series may be a valid 
proxy for potential-output movements when there is not a distinct disturbance term in equation (2); 
otherwise, however, the shock estimates are likely to confound movements in potential GDP, the 
output gap, and the Phillips curve disturbance.  Galí, Gertler, and López-Salido (2001) and Neiss and 
Nelson (2002) offer alternative rationalizations for a Phillips curve disturbance in equation (2).   5
the output gap in policy rules, a result confirmed by Neiss and Nelson (2003) in a richer 
model with capital and habit formation.  In addition, Neiss and Nelson (2002) construct 
a theory-consistent potential output series for Australia, the UK, and the US, and 
estimate New Keynesian Phillips curves using the resulting output-gap series.  The 
results are uniformly better than NKPC estimates using detrended output as a proxy for 
the gap, and resolve many of the empirical difficulties with NKPCs reported in the 
literature.  On the basis of these results and the argument above, we conclude that EF’s 
findings shed little light on the stability over time of the New Keynesian Phillips 
curve.
6 We therefore concentrate in the remainder of this paper on the other structural 
equation in the forward-looking model that EF critique: the optimizing IS equation. 
 
2.3 Stability of the IS equation for the US 
 
EF’s evaluation of the robustness of the forward-looking IS equation to the Lucas 
critique is based on out-of-sample forecasting power and on statistical tests for model 
stability.  This contrasts with the approach that Lucas himself took when evaluating the 
constancy of an empirical optimization-based specification (Lucas, 1988).  Lucas 
refrained from deploying ‘standard statistical tests for the stability of parameter 
estimates across different sample periods’ (1988, pp. 160−162).   Discussing his 
application (which was to money demand), Lucas went on, 
 
  We begin with a simple economic model that suggests a two-parameter description of 
money demand.  When we hypothesize that this relationship is ‘stable’, we mean that 
we expect these two parameters to reflect relatively stable features of consumer 
preferences and the way in which business is carried out, and we expect them not to 
shift around as monetary or other policies are altered over time.  This theory does not 
suggest that the residuals can be characterized in a simple, elegant fashion over a given 
time period, or even that the stochastic structure of the residuals should be stable over 
time. (1988, p. 162). 
 
While our interest is in the stability of the IS equation, not money demand, the same 
principle applies.  The prediction of the optimizing model is that the preference 
parameter(s) in the equation studied should be constant, though the shock processes 
need not be.  For the optimizing IS equation (1), this boils down to the prediction that σ 
is constant over time, even though both the monetary policy regime and the IS shock 
process (vt) may undergo shifts.  In light of his interpretation of stability, Lucas 
—————————————————————————————————— 
6 EF’s misspecification, in other words, is sufficient to conclude that one cannot infer from their results 
that the New Keynesian Phillips curve is truly non-constant—just as one cannot draw inferences about 
the constancy of the parameter c in the relationship y = c.x + e from econometricians’ estimates of y = 
d.z + u, where z is a variable that theory provides no reason to be closely related to x.   6
eschewed statistical tests in favour of direct examination of estimates of the household 
preference parameters across regimes.   
 
In their evaluation of the IS equation, EF do not provide evidence of this kind.  Indeed, 
even their full-sample parameter estimates of the model are not given.  EF (2003) refer 
to EF (2002) for a ‘complete empirical assessment of the relative performance of the 
backward- and forward-looking models in this paper’.  However, the model in EF 
(2003) is estimated, while that in EF (2002) is calibrated from prior studies.  We 
presume EF (2003) meant to refer instead to EF (2000).  The latter working paper 
presents the parameter estimates for the models tested in EF (2003).  EF (2000) only 
report full-sample estimates, with no direct evidence reported on how resilient the key 
slope parameters are to estimation on sub-samples or across regimes.  Instead, as in EF 
(2003), test statistics alone are used to evaluate stability.   
 
 
Table 1. Existing estimates of the IS curve slope coefficient 
 
Study  Data  Estimation method  Estimate of interest 
elasticity of 
aggregate demand 
McCallum and Nelson 
(1999) 
US, quarterly data, 





Estrella and Fuhrer  
(2000) 
US, quarterly data, 







US, quarterly data, 





Ireland (2001)  US, quarterly data, 
1980 Q1–1999 Q2 
Maximum likelihood  0.22 
 
Note: This table gives estimates of b in econometric estimates of IS equations of the type yt = Etyt+1 –
brt+ et where rt is the real interest rate (rt  = Rt – Etπt+1) and et is a stochastic term.  Reported estimates 
have been expressed in comparable units to allow for the different conventions across papers in 
measuring the interest rate (i.e., as annualized or quarterly).  Fuhrer’s estimates use consumption as the 
activity variable and allow for nonseparable utility.  
 
 
Given our focus on the IS equation, there is only one parameter whose stability is of 
interest: the interest elasticity of aggregate demand, σ.  While EF do not report 
subsample results, their (2000) results can be included with estimates in other studies 
for other sample periods to give an impression of the stability of the IS parameter σ 
over time.  We report in Table 1 a collection of estimates of the σ parameter in the IS 
equation from studies on quarterly US data that have used either instrumental variables 
or maximum likelihood estimation.  Despite some overlap of sample periods, these 
studies encompass a variety of approaches.  For example, McCallum and Nelson use a 
decade of data not used in other studies; Ireland (2001) and McCallum and Nelson, but   7
not EF or Fuhrer (2000), exploit cross-equation restrictions from other optimizing 
equations; Ireland and Fuhrer use maximum likelihood procedures; and EF and 
McCallum and Nelson, while both using instrumental variables estimation, employ 
different instrument sets. 
 
Despite this diversity of approaches, the impression from Table 1 is of close agreement 
on the value of σ, including from a study (Ireland’s) that uses data only from the post-
1979 monetary regime.  Accordingly, claims of instability of the optimizing IS equation 
seem unwarranted to us for the United States, provided that stability is interpreted 
appropriately.  Our principal contribution in this paper, however, is to examine 
international evidence on the issue, and we concentrate on that issue henceforth.  
 
3. Policy rule estimates for the UK and Australia 
 
We now move to the empirical evidence we contribute in this paper to the debate.  The 
data we have are 40 years of quarterly observations for both the UK and Australia.  
Following EF, prior to examining the stability issue, we first report estimates of 
interest-rate policy rules for these economies.  As in EF, the specification of the interest 
rate policy rule we use is based on Clarida, Galí, and Gertler (1998, 2000) and Judd and 
Rudebusch (1998), according to which the short-term nominal interest rate is moved in 
partial-adjustment fashion to expected future (quarterly annualized) CPI inflation and 
levels and first differences of detrended (here, HP-filtered) log output: 
 
Rt = (1−ρR)c + (1−ρR)φπEtπt+1
a+ (1−ρR)φyyt
hp + (1−ρR)φ∆y ∆yt
hp + ρRRt−1.  (3) 
 
As in the prior studies, we distinguish between pre- and post-1979 monetary policy 
behaviour by estimating this specification separately over the two subsamples.  Before 
we present our estimates, some general remarks about the appropriateness of 
representing pre-1979 policy by an interest-rate rule are in order.  It is true that in the 
UK and Australia prior to the 1980s, policymakers adopted a plethora of methods to 
influence monetary conditions: reserve requirements, marginal reserve requirements, 
limits on interest rates paid by banks, lending controls, operations in the market for 
long-term government debt—beside operating on short-term rates.  However, this is 
not a distinguishing feature of the UK or Australia relative to the US: the US had its 
own versions of these controls (e.g. the Operation Twist program of intervention in 
the long-term debt market during the Kennedy Administration; Regulation Q on 
housing market loans; prohibition of payment of interest on demand deposits; heavy 
reserve requirements on both banks and non-banks).  Insofar as these measures   8
invalidate representing pre-1979 policy by interest-rate rules, they do so for the US as 
well as the UK and Australia.  Bernanke and Blinder (1992) argue for the US that, 
notwithstanding the multitude of monetary policy tools, it is legitimate to look at the 
short-term interest rate as an index of policy actions.
7 The same principle extends to 
other countries.  To take an example, an increase in reserve requirements by the 
central bank while keeping the short rate constant is ineffective, because the central 
bank then supplies the extra required reserves at the same cost as previously supplied 
reserves (the contractionary effect of higher required reserves are offset by a higher 
quantity of total reserves).
8  Consistent with this, the Governor of the Reserve Bank of 
Australia said as early as 1969 that ‘we would nowadays tend to look at the more 
pervasive instruments of open market operations and interest rates’ rather than direct 
controls (Banker, 1969, p. 1289).  There is one important respect, furthermore, in 
which it is more appropriate for the UK and Australia to model policy as an interest-
rate rule, than it is for the US.  In the US, it was not officially acknowledged until 
1994 that the authorities had an interest-rate instrument; by contrast, in the UK and 
Australia this was always acknowledged.
9 Therefore, there are, if anything, stronger 
grounds for the UK and Australia than for the US to characterize pre-1980s monetary 
policy as a rule for the short rate. 
 
Results for each country and sample are reported in Tables 2 and 3.  Three-month 
Treasury rates are the dependent variable for both countries.
10 We now comment on the 
parameter estimates, and provide comparisons with some prior studies for each country.   
 
We first consider our UK estimates.  As is well known, UK monetary policy has 
undergone several changes in regime.  We concentrate, however, on the break in 
behaviour in 1979, specifically that corresponding to the election of the Thatcher 
Government in 1979 Q2.  While inflation targeting was not introduced until 1992, the  
—————————————————————————————————— 
7 The formal condition for this is that different types of loan and security be a perfect substitute for one 
another.  The perfect-substitution assumption is standard in monetary analysis; in particular, the 
assumption is common to both the backward and forward-looking IS equations that EF (and we) study. 
8 See e.g. Meltzer (2001, p. 25). 
9 The following quotation from Foster (1979, p. 152) illustrates this state of affairs: ‘It is worth 
emphasizing that short-term securities in the United Kingdom differ from those in the United States in 
that the latter are generally viewed as market determined whereas the former have been administered 
through Bank Rate policy…’  By contrast, studies today routinely characterize 1970s US short-term 
rates as policy-determined. 
10 Throughout our sample, the three-month Treasury note rate in both the UK and Australia has been 
closely related with policy actions on short-term interest rates.  For the UK, the various official policy 
rates (Bank Rate, Minimum Lending Rate, repo rate, etc.) have always been highly correlated with the 
Treasury bill rate.  In Australia, the Deputy Governor of the Reserve Bank said in 1964 that ‘it is an 
object of policy to ensure that there is always a ready market for any government security’ (Phillips, 
1964, p. 81), and he mentioned the Treasury note rate as a representative short rate.  Our estimation of 
the IS curve will allow explicitly for the occasion when private rates in Australia differed most sharply 
from the Treasury rate.   9
 
Table 2.  Policy rule estimates: United Kingdom 
 
Specification: Rt = (1−ρR)c + (1−ρR)φπEtπt+1
a+ (1−ρR)φyyt
hp + (1−ρR)φ∆y∆yt
hp + ρRRt−1 
+ price dummies 
  c  φπ  φy  φ∆y  ρR  SEE 
Sample period 
1957 Q2−1979 Q1 
0.037 








(t = 6.40) 
0.0108 
Sample period 
1979 Q2−2002 Q3 
0.014 










Instruments: lags 1−5 of inflation, interest rates, y
hp; also a constant and dummies for tax changes in  
1979 Q3 and 1990 Q2. 
 
 
Table 3.  Policy rule estimates: Australia 
 
 
Specification: Rt = (1−ρR)c + (1−ρR)φπEtπt+1
a+ (1−ρR)φyyt
hp + ρRRt−1 + price dummies 
 
  c  φπ  φy  ρR SEE 
Sample period  






(t = 0.81) 
0.891 
(t = 15.40) 
0.0055 
Sample period  






(t = 1.78) 
0.827 
(t = 16.82) 
0.0111 
Instruments: lags 1−5 of inflation, interest rates, y
hp; also a constant and dummies for tax changes in  
1975 Q3, 1975 Q4, 1976 Q4, and 2000 Q3. 
 
1979 shift was the quantitatively most important break in monetary policy regime, 
whether judged by inflation outcomes (the break in the mean of inflation between the 
1970s and the 1980s being greater than the break observed pre- and post-1992)
11 or the 
visual relation of nominal interest rates to inflation (real rates were permitted to be 
positive from 1979 onward). 
 
Estimates of the UK monetary policy reaction function have been presented for the pre-
1979 period by Nelson (2003), and for post-1979 by Clarida, Galí, and Gertler (1998) 
—————————————————————————————————— 
11 UK inflation did rise above 20% in 1980, but this is not in itself evidence against a monetary policy 
regime break in 1979, because one must allow for a realistic lag in the effect of monetary policy actions 
on inflation.  If we allow for a three-year lag to allow monetary changes to be have most of their effect 
manifested on inflation, then a policy regime in force from 1979−80 should be judged by inflation 
outcomes from 1983.  Annualized RPIX inflation in the UK averaged 5.2% from 1983 Q1 to 1992 Q4, 
down 9.0 percentage points on the prior decade’s mean and consistent with a major change in regime.   10
and Nelson.  As for the US, there is a much lower response to inflation in the policy 
rule before 1979 than afterward, consistent (in the UK at least) with inflation control 
being delegated to other devices such as incomes policy.  We find that the whole post-
1979 period can be characterized as a policy with a coefficient on expected future 
inflation of about 1.6, similar to that found in Nelson for the 1992−97 inflation-
targeting period.  Relative to Nelson’s results, we find here that the 1979−92 period is 
more homogeneous with the inflation-targeting epoch.  In part, this reflects our 
controlling for indirect-tax and other distortions to inflation in our estimation: our 
empirical implementation of equation (3) specifies that policymakers do not respond to 
rises in inflation due to one-time events such as the increase in VAT in 1979.
12 We also 
find strong policy responses to developments in output.
13 
 
Our estimates for Australia indicate that the response to inflation increases from 0.56 in 
the early period to a non-accommodating 1.15 in the second period, which we take to 
be 1980 onward.  These rule estimates seem more plausible and interpretable than those 
for Australia in two previous studies, Gagnon and Ihrig (2002) and Gerlach and Smets 
(2000, pp. 1693−94).  Both studies focus on the 1990s, and neither obtains a rule that 
satisfies a basic version of the Taylor principle (i.e., φπ > 1; see Woodford, 2001).  We 
have several differences in data and specification from these studies, including our use 
of one-period-ahead rather than four-period-ahead inflation in the estimated rule; the 
former, which is CGG’s (1998) baseline specification for several G7 countries, 
evidently produces more plausible results.  The different results are not due to sample 
period choices: our estimates for 1993 Q1−2001 Q4, like our 1980−2002 estimates, 
deliver a rule that satisfies φπ > 1. 
 
This brings us to some further examination of our choice for the regime-break date for 
Australia.  We emphasize again that our aim is to concentrate on a single, 
quantitatively important regime break, and are conscious that further changes in 
regime occurred in the 1990s in both Australia and the UK.  Our choice of a new 
regime starting in 1980 Q1 is in line with Gruen and Shuetrim’s (1994, p. 333) 
nomination of this date on the grounds that ‘the [December 1983 exchange rate] float 
was not an important regime change because, between 1980 and 1983, the exchange 
rate was still fairly flexible.’  Beside the evidence on policy rules presented here, 
other evidence also suggests that a more anti-inflationary policy took place from 
around 1980.  For example, once an allowance is made for a lag of around three years 
from monetary developments to inflation, mean inflation over 1983 Q1−1992 Q4 was 
—————————————————————————————————— 
12 We allow for this in estimation by including dummy variables for the tax changes in the policy rule.  
13 Our UK estimates are consistent with UK policymakers reacting to a form of (annualized) nominal 
income growth, π
a + 4·∆y
hp.   11
6.3%, down 5.4 percentage points from the prior decade.  The 1980-82 period also 
had a real interest rate of 2.3% on average, compared to −1.0% in 1961−79 and 3.0% 
since 1993.  In other words, even prior to the onset of inflation targeting in Australia 
in 1993−94, there was a substantial fall in inflation relative to the 1970s and early 
1980s, consistent with an important break in policy behaviour relative to the 1970s.   
 
Beechey et al’s (2000) work on Australia commences estimation in 1985 Q1, and so 
as a check on our estimates, we reestimated our policy rule estimates against that 
break.  Dropping the 1980−84 observations from the later policy regime does not 
change the estimated long-run responses significantly, but leads to decreased 
precision of the estimates (the t-value for the inflation response falls from 5.2 to 4.5, 
that for the output response from 1.8 to 1.0).  And adding the 1980−84 observations to 
the earlier sample leads to little improvement in the t-value on the output term (this 
rises from 0.8 to 0.9), while sharply reducing the significance of the expected-
inflation term (its t-value falls from 3.1 to 1.3).  These results suggest that our 
emphasis on a 1980 break is appropriate. 
 
The evidence in this section supports the notion that, just as in the US, a very 
substantial monetary policy regime shift occurred in 1979−80 in the UK and Australia.  
We therefore zero in on this period when we estimate the IS equation across regimes. 
 
4.  Estimates of the IS equation for the UK and Australia 
 
With policy rule estimates in hand, we turn to estimation of the IS equation and the 
effect of the 1979−80 regime change on our estimates of structural parameters.  In this 
section we estimate the optimizing IS equation for the UK and Australia for the full 
sample (Section 4.1) and post-1979 (Section 4.2). 
 
4.1 Specification and estimation 
 
The optimizing IS equation that we are interested in estimating takes the form: 
 
yt = b0 + Etyt+1 –σrt + sg(gt – Etgt+1) + vt ,  (4) 
 
where yt is log real GDP, rt is the ex ante short-term real interest rate (defined as Rt – 
Etπt+1) , gt is log real government purchases, and vt is a preference shock, σ > 0, and sg 
is the steady-state share of government purchases in GDP.  Relative to the IS equation 
(1), this formulation allows explicitly for the presence of a public sector.  We discuss 
the inclusion of government spending in the specification further below.   12
The underlying source of this equation deserves attention before we proceed to 
estimation.  Formally, equation (4), like (1), is a semi-logarithmic linear approximation 
of a nonlinear Euler equation, where the linearization is conditional on constant steady-
state values of (yt – Etyt+1) and rt.  In practice, the steady-state growth rate of output, 
E(∆yt), appears to have undergone discrete changes during our 40-year sample period; 
in particular, it appears to be lower in both the UK and Australia for the period after 
1973 than before 1973.  The linear approximation (4) could continue to be valid 
provided the mean of rt shifted along with that of ∆yt.  Neoclassical growth theory does 
suggest that the means of rt and ∆yt should shift together; in that case, the intercept term 
in equation (4) would be unchanged even in the face of changes in E(∆y).  Specifically, 
the nonlinear Euler equation underlying equation (4) takes means into account in the 
sense that it implies the following relation between the means (letting Yt denote the 
unlogged level of output and assuming a constant sg): 
 
E[(Yt/Yt+1)] = E[(1+rt)
−σ]⇒ E[1−∆yt+1] = E[(1+rt)
−σ]⇒E[∆y] ≈ σE(r),  (5) 
 
so DSGE models imply that changes in the steady-state growth of output should be 
proportional to changes in the steady-state real interest rate.  See Laubach and Williams 
(2001) for a recent study of US data that exploits condition (5) to measure changes in 
the steady-state natural interest rate.
14 
  
In practice, however, there are grounds for believing that changes in the steady-state 
real interest rate and economic growth rate have not been closely related in the last 40 
years.  Financial liberalization and deregulation during the 1980s were probably 
associated with a one-time rise in the measured value of rt that simply reflected the 
removal of regulations favouring the holding of government debt.  Thus, the effective 
real interest rate relevant to household spending decisions in the 1970s was probably 
higher than suggested by government security rates, and, correspondingly, the rise in 
effective real rates in the 1980s was more muted than the rise in recorded real rates.  
And much of the fall in the average value of rt in the 1990s in the UK, Australia, and 
other inflation-targeting countries may have reflected a decrease in the risk premium 
arising from the change to a more stable monetary policy environment, rather than a 
decrease in the risk-free ex-ante real interest rate, which appears in the model above.
15 
Moreover, Prescott (1986, p. 30) expresses doubt that the sample mean of the real 
Treasury bill rate is a good approximation of the steady-state real return in a 
neoclassical growth model—reducing the likelihood that the means of ∆yt and rt will be 
—————————————————————————————————— 
14  In econometric terms, the ∆yt and rt series would be co-breaking (Hendry and Mizon, 2000). 
15 A similar property has been found elsewhere.  Examining euro area data for 1982−97, Gerlach and 
Schnabel (2000, p. 166) observe that ‘countries where the credibility of monetary policy is low have 
had relatively high ex-post real interest rates’.   13
linked.  All in all, it seems appropriate to decouple the means of the two series in 
empirical work.  We therefore estimate an interest-elastic, forward looking aggregate 
demand function, while breaking the link between the steady-state growth rate and 
steady-state real rate.
16 We do so by estimating equation (4) as follows: 
 
yt = Etyt+1 + b0 + b1(Rt – Etπt+1
a) + b2D7302t + sg(gt – Etgt+1),  (6) 
 
where D7302t is an intercept dummy equal to 1.0 from 1973 Q4 onwards.  For 
estimation, we have also substituted in the Fisher relation, and annualized both the 
nominal interest rate and the quarterly inflation series.  These nominal variables 
therefore correspond to those used in estimating the policy rules in the previous 
section.  The expected signs in (6) are b1 < 0 and b2 > 0.  We note that equation (6) 
remains valid in an open-economy environment, provided that the interest elasticity is 
interpreted as capturing the net-trade channel of monetary policy, and the IS 
disturbance term is interpreted as including external shocks (Neiss and Nelson, 2003). 
 
Our estimates of (6) by instrumental variables for the UK and Australia are given in 
Table 4.  The instrument set consists of lagged values of the endogenous variables as 
well as dummies for various ‘events’ that shifted the price level (mainly changes in 
indirect taxes).
17 The use of lagged values as instruments involves the assumption of 
white-noise shocks, an assumption not made for the US in McCallum and Nelson 
(1999).  The white-noise assumption seemed more appropriate for the two countries 
we study, in view of the lower serial correlation of ∆yt in the UK and Australia.
18 For 
both countries, in instrumenting for the nominal interest rate, we allow the coefficient 
on inflation to change after 1979−80.  This captures an important aspect of the policy 
regime change of that period, and improves the efficiency of the estimates, while 
staying within an instrumental-variables framework. 
 
The interest elasticity for the UK is highly significant
19 and in close agreement with 
Nelson and Nikolov (2002), who did not allow for an IS intercept-shift in 1973.  The  
—————————————————————————————————— 
16 For ∆y this is implicitly done in studies, such as those of EF (2000, 2003) and Rotemberg and 
Woodford (1997), that detrend the yt series prior to estimating the Euler relationship. 
17 These dummies are those used earlier in our policy rule estimates.  See Neiss and Nelson (2002) for 
more discussion of the price-level dummies for each country. 
18 For example, quarterly OLS regressions of ∆yt on a constant produced Durbin Watson statistics of 
2.08 for Australia and 2.04 for the UK (and corresponding first-order autocorrelations of ∆y of −0.04 
and −0.03 respectively).  These statistics will be indicative of the serial correlation of the IS shock 
when the value of b1 is low, which Table 1 suggests is realistic. 
19 We report conventional t-ratios and use them to evaluate significance.  The estimation programmes 
we used did not generate automatic adjustments of the t-statistics for heteroscedasticity; but we 
compared the conventional t-ratios to approximately valid adjusted ratios and found little difference.   14
 
Table 4. IV estimates of the optimizing IS equation 
 
 United  Kingdom 
Sample period  








1962 Q1−2002 Q2 
b0  −0.0057 
(t = 4.36) 
−0.0103 
(t = 5.21) 
−0.0103 
(t = 5.15) 
b1  −0.0844 
(t = 3.92) 
−0.0455 
(t = 1.66) 
−0.0508 
(t = 1.84) 
b2 0.0029 
(t = 1.77) 
0.0058 
(t = 2.38) 
0.0062 
(t = 2.49) 
Dummy for 
1974 Q2 
— —  −0.0246 






a Parameter imposed based on first-moment information (the sample mean of the 
government consumption/GDP share). 
 
Instruments:  
UK:  πt−1, πt−2, πt−3, R t−1, R t−2, R t−3,  yt−1,  yt−2,  yt−3, g t−1, g t−2, g t−3, dummies,  
constant. 
Australia: πt−1, R t−1,  yt−1, g t−1, lag 1 of log US output, dummies, constant. 
The coefficient on πt−1 in the instrumenting for Rt is allowed to change after 1979 Q1 
(UK) or 1979 Q4 (Australia). 
 
shift term approaches significance for the UK and is highly significant for Australia.
20  
The estimated value of the interest elasticity is imprecisely estimated (t = 1.7) for 
Australia, but similar in magnitude to the values for the US in Table 1, noting that the 
Table 1 estimates should be divided by four in making comparisons.  Some of the 
imprecision of the interest elasticity reflects the influence of a single observation—the 
second quarter of 1974, when output fell sharply.  During this episode, the 
government’s monetary squeeze was felt more strongly in monetary aggregates and 
returns on private loans than on government paper, as Figure 1, which plots the 
Treasury note rate against a private rate of the same maturity, shows.  The model 
underlying equation (1), in which different non-money assets are perfect substitutes, 
does not allow for the character of this squeeze.
21 As Table 4 shows, including a  
 
—————————————————————————————————— 
20 The lower significance of the 1973 shift in the UK partly reflects the fact that this shift was partially 
reversed in the 1980s.  For this reason, when we estimate backward-looking IS equations for the UK 
using detrended output as the dependent variable, some of our results will allow for trend-breaks in 
both 1973 and 1981.   
21 Note that backward-looking models of the Rudebusch-Svensson type share this limitation.   15












dummy for the 1974 Q2 observation has little effect on the estimated interest 
elasticity in the IS function, but increases slightly the precision of the estimate. 
 
4.2 Estimates following 1979−80 regime break 
 
We now consider the issue of regime break by the method suggested in Section 2.  
Specifically, we re-estimate the IS equations on data following the monetary policy 
regime break of 1979−80, and compare the full-sample and single-regime estimates.  
Our post-1979 estimates are given in Table 5.  For the UK, the estimated interest 
elasticity is again negative and highly significant.  The point estimate is larger in 
absolute value, but the difference with the full-sample estimate is not statistically 
significant.
22 This direct examination is therefore supportive of stability of the IS 
equation for the UK.  A similar conclusion holds for Australia: the interest-elasticity 
estimate remains negative and is not different statistically from the full-sample value, 
although, in this case, the precision of the estimate is low. 
 
—————————————————————————————————— 
22 The confidence intervals for the full-sample and post-1979 interest elasticities substantially overlap.  
In addition, we tested the significance of a post-1979 slope-dummy variable, defined as the real interest 
rate series generated by the full-sample estimates of equation (4) multiplied by a dummy equal to 1.0 
from 1979 Q2.  The slope-dummy variable had a reported t-statistic of 1.68, which overstates its 
significance on account of the variable being a generated regressor.   16
 
Table 5. IV estimates of the optimizing IS equation after 1979 
 
   
United Kingdom 
Sample period  




1980 Q1−2002 Q2 
 
b0  0.0002 
(t = 0.29) 
−0.0052 
(t = 2.74) 
b1  −0.1319 
(t = 5.17) 
−0.0264 
(t = 0.70) 




a Imposed parameter. 
 
Instruments: 
UK: πt−1, πt−2, πt−3, R t−1, R t−2, R t−3,  yt−1,  yt−2,  yt−3, g t−1, g t−2, g t−3, dummies,  
constant. 
Australia: πt−1, R t−1,  yt−1,  g t−1, lag 1 of log US output, dummies, constant. 
 
 
In Table 6 we present some robustness results.  First, we investigate the implications 
of omitting the government-expenditure term.  The formal derivation of the IS 
equation (4) from optimizing behaviour suggests that this term should be included 
(see e.g. Walsh, 2003, Woodford, 2003, and references therein), but estimates for the 
U.S. typically leave it in the disturbance term.  We have explicitly included it in our 
estimates and, in line with the theory, imposed its value at the steady-state share of 
government spending to output (obtained in practice by the sample mean of this ratio).  
When we instead drop this term from the estimated specification, Table 6 shows that 
our estimated IS equations remain very similar for both countries.  For the UK, the 
estimated interest elasticity of aggregate demand drops slightly in significance; for 
Australia, it actually increases in significance, so that now the t-statistic for the interest 
elasticity does exceed 2.  On the other hand, as Table 6 also shows, suppressing the 
government-expenditure term delivers less satisfactory results for Australia after 1980 
because now the point estimate for the interest elasticity is wrongly signed.  Explicitly 
controlling for the government expenditure term therefore does seem useful for both 
countries, and our preferred estimates remain those in Table 5. 
 
Also in Table 6, we allow for a second break in the intercept of the IS equation.  We 
include an intercept dummy equal to 1.0 from 1994 Q4, to capture the apparent break 
in productivity and output growth that seems to have occurred around then.  The point 
estimate on the dummy is consistent with much of the post-1973 growth slowdown  
   17
 
Table 6. Robustness checks on optimizing IS equation estimates 
 
  Government expenditure term omitted  Intercept change  
from 1994 Q4 
  United Kingdom 
Sample period  












1962 Q1−2002 Q2 
b0  −0.0068 
(t = 5.28) 
−0.0132 
(t = 7.20) 
−0.0084 
(t = 4.42) 
−0.0103 
(t = 5.15) 
b1  −0.0789 
(t = 3.70) 
−0.0534 
(t = 2.08) 
0.0045 
(t = 0.12) 
−0.0509 
(t = 1.84) 
b2 0.0031 
(t = 1.92) 
0.0072 
(t = 3.18) 
— 0.0070 
(t = 2.70) 
Dummy for 
1974 Q2 
—  −0.0240 
(t = 2.57) 
—  −0.0247 













  −0.0030 
(t = 1.05) 
a Imposed parameter. 
 
Instruments:  
UK:  πt−1, πt−2, πt−3, R t−1, R t−2, R t−3,  yt−1,  yt−2,  yt−3, g t−1, g t−2, g t−3, dummies, constant. 
Australia: πt−1, R t−1,  yt−1, g t−1, lag 1 of log US output, dummies, constant. 
The coefficient on πt−1 in the instrumenting for Rt is allowed to change after 1979 Q1 (UK) or 1979 Q4 
(Australia). 
 
being reversed; however, inclusion of the dummy has no effect on our estimate of the 
interest elasticity of the IS equation. 
 
5. Comparison with backward-looking specifications 
 
The backward-looking IS equation that EF study is that of Rudebusch and Svensson 








t−2 + β r
b




t =  ¼(Σi=0
3 [Rt−i − π
a
t−i]).  Specification (7) is ‘backward-looking’: there are no 
terms in expected future output (which appear when the IS equation is derived from   18
optimizing behaviour, as in equation (1)); nor are the lags of the interest rate or output  
justified from an optimization problem.  The nominal interest rate appears as a lagged 
moving average, with the current nominal rate (which appears in the optimizing IS 
equation) absent.  Furthermore, the nominal interest rate is converted into a real interest 
rate rt
b by subtracting current quarterly inflation, rather than the rational expectation of 
next quarter’s inflation, as occurs in the optimizing case. 
 
Because equation (7) recognizes no forward-looking terms and has unjustified lagged 
terms, a DSGE-based approach to modelling would classify estimates of equation (7) as 
reduced-form estimates.  The coefficients estimated, therefore, would not correspond to 
underlying preference parameters, and would be predicted by DSGE theory to shift 
with regime changes.  According to EF’s stability tests, on the other hand, equation (7) 
exhibits a degree of constancy over time on US data that makes it more suitable for 
policy analysis than formal theory would suggest.   
 
As we have emphasized, however, an added dimension on which to determine whether 
an IS equation is structural is to examine estimates from other countries.  To that end, 
we estimate the Rudebusch-Svensson IS equation on UK and Australian data.  The 








k βi (Rt−i − π
a
t−i) + ut.  (8) 
 
Equation (8) allows richer lagged dynamics than (7), and also lets the lagged rates  
appear in a less constrained way (i.e. with different weights over a year) while still 
appearing as a type of ‘real rate’.  As it is detrended log output that appears in these IS 
equations,
23 we present estimates for three different empirical counterparts to y
d: those 
arising from Hodrick-Prescott filtering, quadratic detrending, and a broken linear 
trend.
24 The HP filter uses a filtering parameter of 1600; the broken trend uses break-
dates of 1973 Q4 for both countries, with an additional break in 1981 Q4 for the UK.  
 
For the UK, the estimates of the interest elasticity (the sum of coefficients on r
b
t) are 
almost all wrongly signed—positive—across sample periods, detrending methods for 
output, and whether equation (7) or (8) is estimated.  The only exception is the  
—————————————————————————————————— 
23 The optimizing IS equation, on the other hand, refers to the log-level of output, or rather a forward-
looking first difference of log output, hence our use of yt as the dependent variable in the previous 
section.  
24 The original Rudebusch-Svensson specification used the Congressional Budget Office’s estimate of 
the output gap as the dependent variable.  As noted above, this series resembles US quadratically 
detrended log output, and does not correspond to the output gap concept stressed by DSGE models.   19
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(t = 0.53) 
 











(t = 0.03) 
1957 Q1−2002 Q4  1−4  0.717 
(t = 13.71) 
1−4   0.003 
(t = 0.21) 
1979 Q2−2002 Q4  1−4  0.819 
(t = 15.40) 
1−4  0.029 




t = Quadratically detrended log output 
 
 











(t = 0.59) 
 











(t = 2.17) 
1957 Q1−2002 Q4  1−4  0.928 
(t = 36.27) 
1−4  −0.008 
(t = 0.39) 
1979 Q2−2002 Q4  1−4  0.944 
(t = 37.76) 
1−4  0.055 








1957 Q1−2002 Q4 
1−2   
0.886 






(t = 0.29) 
 
1979 Q2−2002 Q4 
1−2   
0.935 






(t = 1.67) 
 
1957 Q1−2002 Q4 
1−4  0.847 
(t = 22.99) 
1−4  0.005 
(t = 0.29) 
 
1979 Q2−2002 Q4 
1−4  0.896 
(t = 27.29) 
1−4  0.056 
(t = 1.72) 
a. y
d is obtained by regressions of log real GDP on a constant, a time trend, and each of these 
terms multiplied by dummy variables equal to 1.0 after 1973 Q3 and 1981 Q3. 
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1962 Q4−2002 Q3  1−2  0.644 




(t = 0.37) 
— — 
1980 Q1−2002 Q3  1−2  0.775 




(t = 0.02) 
— — 
1962 Q4−2002 Q3  1−4  0.539 
(t = 7.09) 
1−4  0.008 
(t = 0.38) 
— — 
1980 Q1−2002 Q3  1−4  0.718 
(t = 11.66) 
1−4  −0.000 
(t = 0.004) 
— — 
1962 Q4−2002 Q3  1−4  0.519 
(t = 6.12) 
1−4  0.004 
(t = 0.21) 
1−4  0.133 
(t = 1.93) 
1980 Q1−2002 Q3  1−4  0.617 
(t = 6.72) 
1−4  −0.001 
(t = 0.03) 
1−4  0.186 





t measured by quadratically detrended log output 
1962 Q4−2002 Q3  1−2  0.950 




(t = 0.07) 
— — 
1980 Q1−2002 Q3  1−2  0.954 




(t = 1.07) 
— — 
1962 Q4−2002 Q3  1−4  0.938 
(t = 28.35) 
1−4  −0.010 
(t = 0.33) 
— — 
1980 Q1−2002 Q3  1−4  0.946 
(t = 31.65) 
1−4  −0.045 
(t = 1.26) 
— — 
1962 Q4−2002 Q3  1−4  0.897 
(t = 19.81) 
1−4  −0.014 
(t = 0.47) 
1−4  0.107 
(t = 2.09) 
1980 Q1−2002 Q3  1−4  0.889 
(t = 14.95) 
1−4  −0.069 
(t = 1.94) 
1−4  0.111 
(t = 1.61) 
 










   21
estimates for equation (8) for the full sample when quadratically detrended log GDP is 
the dependent variable.  Here, however, the interest elasticity estimate is highly  
insignificant statistically, in contrast to the corresponding full-sample estimates for the 
UK optimizing IS equation.  Moreover, as Table 7 shows, the interest elasticity 
coefficients obtained with this dependent variable break into sizeable and quite 
statistically significant positive values when estimated on post-1979 data, hardly the 
behaviour of a structural parameter estimate. 
 
For Australia, estimates of equation (7) and (8) generally deliver interest elasticity 
estimates that are either wrongly signed (the full-sample estimates) or highly 
statistically insignificant (the post-1979 estimates).  Somewhat better results, though 
still far from statistical significance, arise with y
d measured by quadratically detrended 
output.  
 
We have so far omitted explicit open-economy terms from our estimated specifications.  
For the optimizing IS equation, this neglect can be justified on theoretical grounds, as 
noted earlier.  For the backward-looking IS equation, the specification choice reflects 
prior findings for the UK that neither the real exchange rate nor world output enters 
significantly when included (see e.g. Goodhart and Hofmann, 2003, and references 
therein).  For Australia, the omission of terms-of-trade or real exchange rate variables 
reflects the fact that, again, these variables are rarely close to statistical significance, 
especially when long sample periods are considered (see e.g. Robinson, Stone, and van 
Zyl, 2003).  Beechey et al (2000) report, however, that US output enters significantly in 
a backward-looking IS equation.  We add detrended US output to equation (8), and 
report our estimates for Australia in Tables 8 and 9.   
 
The foreign-output term generally enters significantly and positively across samples.  
With this term included, and with y
d measured as quadratically detrended log output, 
the Rudebusch-Svensson specification does have some respectable properties: quite a  
significant post-1979 interest elasticity estimate (t = 1.9) and little change in the 
parameter estimates across samples—although the point estimate of the interest 
elasticity diminishes fairly sharply when pre-1980 data are included.  Since this 
specification is the only backward-looking IS equation that we have found that appears  
 to exhibit parameter estimates that are both interpretable and constant, we further 
explored it by adding the dummy for 1974 Q2 that we found important in Table 4.  
When included, the coefficient estimate on this dummy is negative and highly 
significant (t = 3.1), while the estimated short-run interest elasticity increases in 
absolute value from −0.014 to −0.029, closer to the post-1979 value of −0.069.    
However, the t-statistic for the interest-elasticity estimate is still only 1.0, compared to 
the 1.8 we found for the forward-looking specification.   22
 












































(t = 0.18) 
— — 





(t = 0.66) 
— — 
1962 Q4−2002 Q3  1−4  0.713 
(t = 11.56)
1−4  0.005 
(t = 0.19) 
— — 
1980 Q1−2002 Q3  1−4  0.836 
(t = 17.27)
1−4  0.023 
(t = 0.69) 
— — 
1962 Q4−2002 Q3  1−4  0.655 
(t = 8.91) 
1−4  −0.001 
(t = 0.06) 
1−4  0.134 
(t = 2.48) 
1980 Q1−2002 Q3  1−4  0.662 
(t = 7.38) 
1−4  0.019 
(t = 0.57) 
1−4  0.211 
(t = 2.84) 
 
Note: For both the US and Australia, y
d is obtained by regressions of log real GDP on a constant, a time trend, 
and each of these terms multiplied by a dummy variable equal to 1.0 after 1973 Q3.  The sample for the 
detrending is 1954 Q1−2002 Q4 for US real GDP, 1959 Q3−2002 Q4 for Australia real GDP. 
 
 
Perhaps more important, the reasonable results we obtain for Australia when GDP is 
quadratically detrended are not robust to alternative detrending procedures.  The 
backward-looking equations uniformly deliver positive or virtually-zero interest 
elasticity estimates when output is detrended by HP filtering or (as in Table 8) by 
broken trends. 
 
We therefore conclude that when full-sample and post-1979 estimates are compared 
directly, backward-looking IS equations seem to be less satisfactory and less constant 
than the forward-looking alternative.  For both Australia and the UK, the key IS 
equation parameter (the interest elasticity) appears to exhibit better properties—full- 
sample statistical significance, robustness to including pre-1980 observations, and 
correct signs—when the optimizing IS equation is estimated.  
 
While most of the interest elasticity estimates for the backward-looking IS equations 
are wrongly signed, few of them are significantly different from negative values.  Why 
then do we place so much emphasis on the wrong signs of the point estimates?  We do   23
so for two reasons.  First, IS equations of the type we discuss in this paper are 
principally employed for policy analysis—especially stochastic simulation exercises 
where they are used in conjunction with a Phillips curve and alternative policy rules—
and, in these exercises, it is the point estimates of the parameters that are used.  
Wrongly-signed coefficient estimates then render the IS equation ‘unusable’.  The 
incorrect signs in the empirical IS equations in this section therefore undermine the 
usefulness of these equations for policy analysis.  Secondly, non-optimizing equations 
are often advocated on the grounds that empirical estimates of the key elasticities in 
optimizing models are wrongly signed.  By contrast, we find for the UK and Australia 
that it is the backward-looking equations that have severe problems with wrong signs. 
 
It should also be noted that, notwithstanding the wrong signs, most of the IS equations 
in this section ‘fit’ better, in the sense of lower residual standard deviation, than the 
optimizing IS equations estimated in Section 4.
25 But, in contrast to EF, and in the spirit 
of Lucas (1988), we do not regard this concept of fit as an appropriate criterion for 
judging the validity of an IS equation.  The backward-looking IS equations have a built-
in good fit by their specification of generous, unrestricted lags of the dependent 
variable.  What should be used as a criterion is something that does not automatically 
arise from the specification: the constancy across sub-samples of the key structural 
parameter, namely the real interest elasticity of aggregate demand.  By this criterion, 





In this paper, we have offered an alternative perspective on the constancy of empirical 
optimization-based models to the judgement of Estrella and Fuhrer (2003).  In the spirit 
of Lucas (1988), we have evaluated the constancy of both optimizing and backward-
looking IS equations in terms of the robustness of a key parameter estimate to the 
inclusion of observations from a different monetary policy regime.  We have also 
concentrated on international evidence—quarterly estimates for the UK and Australia, 
instead of the US.  The result of this comparison suggests that empirical optimizing IS 
equations are more stable and interpretable than are the backward-looking alternatives.  
The use of current DSGE models in empirical work does deliver material benefits, in 
the form of equations that are more suitable for monetary policy analysis. 
 
—————————————————————————————————— 
25 Direct comparisons of residual standard deviations are difficult as the forward-looking IS equation 
pertains to the log-level or log-difference of output, while the backward-looking equation refers to a 
detrended or filtered version of log output.   24
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